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I.
A.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case

Potlatch School District No .. 285 and Board of Trustees, Potlatch School
District No, 285 (hereinafter collectively referred to as "School District", pursuant
to I.A.R. 35(d)) agree with the general ideas put forth in the Opening Brief by
Potlatch Education Association and Doug Richard (hereinafter collectively referred
to as "PEA", pursuant to I.A.R. 35(d)), though they would state them differently.
The nature of this case is a contract dispute between School District and PEA
regarding whether the School District Master Agreement gives the School District
discretion to determine whether to allow an employee to take a professional leave
day.
B.

Course of Proceedings Below

The School District does not disagree with the PEA's statement regarding
the Course of Proceedings Below, see Appellants' Opening Brief, pp. 1 - 3, and
does not add anything to the PEA's statement.
C.

Statement of the Facts

The School District disagrees with certain material facts as stated by the
PEA, as stated below. Other material facts also necessary for consideration are
presented below.
1.

The PEA argues that "[t]he PEA and the School District eventually

agreed to the School District's Professional Leave proposal." Appellants' Opening
Brief, p. 4. The School District disputes this contention. The Affidavit of Brian
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Potter contains a "side-by-side comparison of the School Board's and the PEA's
respective proposals concerning Professional Leave (with the School Board's
proposals in the left column and the PEA's proposals in the right column)." See R.

Vol. I, pp.'82, 86 - 87. This side-by-side comparison reads as follows:
10.5 Professional Leave.
Attendance
at educational · meetings or visiting
other schools is permitted at full pay if
such absence is approved by the
Superintendent. If any teacher wishes
to be absent from duty for a brief
period to attend a professional meeting
or workshop, to visit schools, or
otherwise
pursue
professional
development, a written request for
approval of such absence should be
signed by the principal and filed in the
superintendent's office at least ten ( 1 0)
working days prior to the first day of
anticipated absence. Professional leave
is not to exceed two (2) days per year
and is noncumulative.

5.6 Professional Leave Attendance at
educational meetings or visiting other
schools is permitted at full pay if such
absence is approved by the principal. If
any supervisor, principal, teacher, or
other employee wishes to be absent
from duty for a brief period to attend a
professional meeting, to visit schools,
or for any personal reason which is not
an unavoidable emergency, a written
request for approval of such absence
should be signed by the principal and
filed in the superintendent's office at
least two (2) days prior to the first day
of anticipated absence.

R. Vol. I, p. 87. The Professional Leave provision incorporated into the Master
Agreement reads:
10.5 Professional Leave
Attendance at educational meetings or
visiting other schools is permitted at full pay if such absence is
approved by the Principal. If any certificated personnel wishes to be
absent from duty for a brief period to attend a professional meeting, to
visit schools, or otherwise pursue professional development, a written
request for approval of such absence should be signed by the Principal
and filed in the Superintendent's office at least two (2) days prior to
the first day of anticipated absence. Professional leave is not to
exceed two (2) days per year and is non-cumulative. The Principal may
make exceptions on the number of days allowed when necessary.

R. Vol. II, pp. 185 - 86. When compared with the versions proposed by the School
District and by the PEA, the final version is an amalgamation of verbiage proposed
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by both entities, as well as. some new language. Thus it is unfair for the PEA to
argue that both sides "eventually agreed to the School District's" proposed
language for the Professional Leave provision.
2.

The PEA argues that "The School District's sole reason for denying

Richards professional leave· and/or refusing to reclassify the personal leave to
professional leave was based on its belief that Richards' defense of his Master's
final project did not constitute professional leave· under the terms of the Master
Agreement." Appellants' Opening Brief, p. 6. This is not an entirely accurate
statement. More accurately, that was the only stated reason why the School
District denied Mr. Richards professional leave. See R. Vol. I, pp. 108, 110. The
School District also argued that Mr. Richards was not entitled to additional
professional leave because he had already used up more than two professional
leave days for the year. R. Vol. I, pp. 137 - 39. However, the District Court later
ruled that the School District had waived this argument, as the School District had
not given it as a reason to deny professional leave during any of the grievance
process. Tr. Vol. I, p. 32, II. 4 - 13. Regardless, it is incorrect for the PEA to state
the "sole reason" Mr. Richards was denied professional leave was any one
particular reason.
3.

Along the same lines as above, the PEA states that Mr. Richards

"requested a total of two (2) professional leave days for absences that he believed
qualified for professional leave purposes, one of which was to defend his Master's
final project." Appellants' Opening Brief, p. 6. While this alleged fact is not
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necessarily relevant to the decision of this case', it is nonetheless a factual issue.
In its Response to the PEA's Motion for Summary Judgment, the School District
has pointed to numerous other times during the school year in question in which
Mr. Richards was granted professional leave, both before anp after the incident in
question. See R. Vol. II, pp. 217, 219 - 20, 222, and 229. The School District
accepts that this is a disputed issue of fact. 2
4.

Mr: Richards was hired as a music teacher, and his teaching contract

specifically indicates that he was assigned as an "Elementary/Secondary Music
Teacher." R. Vol. I, p. 71.
5.

The School District does not argue that Mr. Richards was defending

his master's degree on or about May 3, 2007. Appellants' Opening Brief, pp. 5 6. However, the type of master's degree is important. It is relevant to note that Mr.
Richards' master's degree was not a general "Master's Degree in Education" as
contended by the PEA, Appellant's Opening Brief, p. 5, but was more specifically a
master's degree in education administration. R. Vol. I, p. 110.
6.

Certificated teachers typically have 190-day contracts. Tr. Vol. I, p.

27, II. 24 - 25; R. Vol. II, p. 197. The Master Agreement contains provision for a
minimum of 24 days of various types of leave that must be given to certificated
personnel if requested. R. Vol. I, p. 133. This includes 11 days of mandatory sick

The School District makes this argument on the basis that Judge Stegner ruled that the
School District had essentially waived its right to bring this argument.
2

Judge Stegner did not address this issue as he considered the School District's arguments
related to it as waived.
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leave, R. Vol. II, p. 183, three (3) days of mandatory family leave, R. Vol. II, p.
185, three (3) days of mandatory funeral leave, R. Vol. II, p. 185, four (4) days of
personal leave, R. Vol. II, p. 185, and three (3) days of association leave, R. Vol. II,
pp. 187 ...: 88. This calculation of 24 mandatory leave days does not include the
unlimited number of paid leave days to serve on jury duty. R. Vol. II, p. 187. Each
of these types of leave is non-discretionary, stating that the School District "shall"
grant such leave if requested. See R. Vol. II, pp. 183, 185, 187 - 88 (Master
Agreement § § 10.1, 10.3, 10.4, and 10. 7). The only type of leave discussed in
the Master Agreement which does not contain language mandating that the School
District provide such leave if requested is professional leave. R. Vol. I, pp. 185 -

86.
7.

The PEA left out an essential fact which will aid this Court in

understanding the District Court's ruling. District Judge John R. Stegner, from
whose ruling this appeal is taken, was integrally involved in the negotiation process
regarding the Master Agreement between the School District and the PEA. Tr. Vol.
I, p. 6, II. 2 - 20; p. 13, II. 11 - 15. Judge Stegner stated "Well, having spent four
days in trying to help the District and the Education Association hammer out the
agreement, I don't think I've ever seen an as arms-length agreement as that which
I tried to help hammer out." Tr. Vol. I, p. 13, II. 11 - 15. Judge Stegner was
intimately familiar with the Master Agreement, the background negotiations, and
the intent of the parties. Therefore, he was in a uniquely qualified position to make
the ruling that he made.
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II.

RESTATED AND ADDITIONAL ISSUES ON APPEAL

The School District believes that the issues on appeal may be simply stated
as follows:
(a) ·

Did the Schoo.I District, through its principals and administrators, have
discretion in determining whether to grant Mr. Richards' request for
professional lea've?

(b)

If so, did the School District act within the bounds of its discretion?

Ill.

ATTORNEYS FEES ON APPEAL

The School District requests that they be awarded attorney fees on appeal
pursuant to J.C. § § 12-121 and 12-117.

IV.
A.

ARGUMENT

Standard of Review for an Appeal from a Grant of Summary Judgment.

"On an appeal from an order granting summary judgment, this Court's
standard of review is the same as the standard used by the district court in ruling
on a motion for summary judgment." Lettunich v. Key Bank Nat'/ Ass'n, 141 Idaho
362, 366 (2005). Summary judgment is appropriate "if the pleadings, depositions,
and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a.
judgment as a matter of law." I.R.C.P. 56(c).
"When questions of law are presented, this Court exercises free review and
is not bound by findings of the district court, but is free to draw its own
conclusions from the evidence presented." Mut. of Enumclaw v. Box, 1 27 Idaho
851, 852 (1995). "The interpretation of a contract's meaning and legal effect are
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questions of law to be decided by the Court if the terms of the contract are clear
and unambiguous." State v. Barnett, 133 Idaho 231, 234 ( 1999). "The fact that
both parties move for summary judgment does not in and of itself establish that
there is no genuine issue of material fact. The fact that the parties have filed crossmotions for summary judgm·ent does not change the applicable standard of review,
and this Court must evaluate each party's motion on its own merits." Shawver v.
Huckleberry Estates, LL. C., 140 Idaho 354, 360 (2004) (citing Kromrei v. AID Ins.
Co., 110 Idaho 549, 551 (1986), and Stafford v. Klosterman, 134 Idaho 205, 207

(2000)).
B.

The Language of the Professional Leave Clause Gives the School District
Discretion to Determine What Constitutes Professional Development, and the
School District Acted Reasonably in Denying Mr. Richards Professional
Leave.

The PEA contends that Judge Stegner erred on numerous grounds in not
granting summary judgment to the PEA. However, Judge Stegner's determination
that the School District was entitled to Summary Judgment was based on a very
simple legal construct: the Professional Leave provision gives the School District
discretion to determine whether to grant professional leave, and the School District
did not act unreasonably in denying Mr. Richards' request for professional leave. In
Judge Stegner's own words:
. . . I think by the use of the word "if," the parties agree that some
discretion would be afforded the District. Then, I think it's incumbent
upon me to try to identify the parameters of that discretion.
Mr. Julian referred to arbitrary and capricious. I think that's
clearly something that is a direction they cannot go. I think general
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contract provisions would require good faith .and fair dealing within the
parameters of the interpretations of this agreement.
So, the District has discretion. The parameters are arbitrary and
capricious and good faith and fair dealing. And then the question is
does a master's in administration for a teacher of music fall within
professional development.
While I thought before when I read the agreement, I thought
that the Education Assocation and Mr. Richards would win. I think
that after having had a chance to review the information and have the
facts laid out before me, while your initial point may be that it was,
Mr. Rumel, that it may be short-sighted on the part of the District, I
don't think they have violated the contract. So, I am granting
summary judgment on behalf of the District as far as this particular
issue is concerned.
Well, were this a master's in pedagogy, music pedagogy, music
performance, anything that I would consider to be within the ambit of
Mr. Richards' responsibilities, I don't think there would be any doubt
that that would - that this decision would be different than it is today.
Were there some suggestion that the District were cultivating Mr.
Richards for an administrative position, or if somebody had said to him
we'd like you to pursue administration because we need
administrators, I think the facts would be different ....
. . . I think the District has an obligation to identify some
problem in providing it, i.e, [sic] it came too quickly, or there aren't
any subs that are available to provide leave on this particular occasion,
those I think would be legitimate bases for the District to deny the
request. Beyond that, I don't know what else would.
And I think there has to be - I think arbitrary and capricious are
- it cannot be arbitrary and capricious. It can't be a violation of good
faith and fair dealing. And as I - I mean, I think you hit the nail on the
head at the outset. It may be short-sighted, but whether that's within
the discretion is another question.
Tr. Vol./, p. 32, I. 13 - p. 33, I. 13; p. 34, II. 2 - 12; p. 34, I. 23 - p. 35, I. 10.
Judge Stegner makes it clear that he believes that the School District has discretion
in determining whether to grant professional leave. This is in accord with the
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language of the Master Agreement, which states "Attendance at educational
meetings or visiting other schools is permitted at full pay .if such absence is

approved by the Principal." R. Vol. II, p. 185 (Master Agreement

§

10.5). There is

nothing in 'the Master Agreement which would contradict the. plain language of this
statement, which is that professional leave is available only if it is approved by the
Principal. Further, this language is different from every other type of leave
discussed in the Master Agreement, all of which state that the leave "shall" be
granted. See § I.C.6., supra. Thus, Judge Stegner properly recognized that there
was discretion.
The next issue he discussed was whether the School District acted within
the bounds of that discretion. Judge Stegner determined that there were some
limits on that discretion, and that it was not unlimited. Tr. Vol. /, p. 32, I. 24 - p.
33, I. 3. The Idaho Courts have recognized that, in some circumstances, a contract
provision which gives a party seemingly unlimited discretion to accept or deny a
particular act by another party may be inherently limited. In Funk v. Funk, 102
Idaho 521 (1981), a lessee sought the consent of the lessor to sublease farm land.
Funk v. Funk, 102 Idaho 521,522 (1981). The lease stated that the lessee could
sublease the property if they obtained consent of the lessor. Funk, 102 Idaho at
522. The lessor declined to give consent unless the lease terms were substantially
rewritten. Funk, 102 Idaho at 522. This Court held that under the circumstances,
though the language of the contract did not specifically state, "the consent of a
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lessor may not be unreasonably withheld." Funk, 102 Idaho at 524 (emphasis
added).
A similar result was reached in Cheney v. Jemmett, 107 Idaho 829 (1984),
another case which involved a property contract dispute. In that case, the contract
stated that "[the] Purchasers agree that they will not assign this agreement, nor
any interest herein or in the property hereby agreed to be sold and purchased,
without first obtaining the written consent of Sellers." Cheney, 107 Idaho at 830.
Regarding this clause, this Court stated "In our view, the interpretation of a nonassignment clause conditioned on the consent of the seller as in the present case,
necessarily implies that the seller will act reasonably and in good faith in exercising
his right of approval." Cheney, 107 Idaho at 832. The Court further cited to other
cases holding similarly:
The Utah Supreme Court cogently expressed our views in this regard.
"Where a contract provides that the matter of approval of
performance is reserved to a party, he must 'act fairly and in good
faith in exercising that right. He has no right to withhold arbitrarily his
approval; there must be a reasonable justification for doing so."'
Prince v. Elm Investment Co., 649 P.2d 820, 825 (Utah 1982);
(quoting William G. Vandever & Co. v. Black, 645 P.2d 637, 639
(Utah 1982)); see also W.P. Harlin Construction Co. v. Utah State
Road Commission, 19 Utah 2d 364, 431 P.2d 792 (1967).
Additionally, the Supreme Court of Montana has stated that "[when] a
matter in a contract is left to the determination of one party alone,
that party's determination is conclusive if he acts in good faith."
Brown v. First Federal Savings and Loan Association, 154 Mont. 79,
460 P.2d 97, 100 (1969) (emphasis added); cf. Meredith Corp. v.
Design & Lithography Center, Inc., 101 Idaho 391, 614 P.2d 414
( 1980) (satisfaction requirement determined by reasonable person
standard).
Cheney, 107 Idaho at 832 - 33 (emphasis in the original).
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Both Funk and Cheney involve property contract disputes surrounding the
right of assignment. It is not · clear whether this Court intended this · line of
precedent to extended to non,assignment contract issues. The language cited in
Cheney, though, is broad enough to include all contractual. issues, and not just

those involving rights of assignment. 3 Thus, the issue is twofold: first, if Judge
Stegner was incorrect, and there is no requirement that the School District act in
good faith or be reasonable in exercising discretion, then Judge Stegner' s ruling
was still proper. He recognized that the School District exercised its discretion,
which the Master Agreement clearly allows the School District power to do.
Therefore, the School District cannot be wrong, regardless of what decision it
made, so long as it exercised discretion.
Second, if this Court determines that the School District is bound by a
standard of "reasonableness" in the exercise of its discretion, then the issue was
still appropriately decided by Judge Stegner. The facts show that Mr. Richards'
teaching contract shows that his assignment was as an "Elementary/Secondary
Music Teacher". R. Vol. I, p. 71. In contrast, Mr. Richards' Masters' Degree was in
Educational Administration. R. Vol. I, p. 110. 4

The PEA makes a great deal of

3

It should be noted that Prince v. Elm Inv. Co., 649 P.2d 820 (Utah 1982) also involves a
property issue, but not the right of assignment. The issue in Prince is under what circumstances a
party can reject a right of first refusal. Prince, 649 p.2d at 821. Brown v. First Fed. Sav. & loan
Ass'n, 460 P.2d 97 (Mont. 1969) (overruled on other grounds, Estate of Strever v. Cline, 278
Mont. 165, 178 (Mont, 1996)) also involves property issues, but the contract in question was a
mortgage loan. Brown, 460 P.2d at 98.
4

As an aside, the School District finds delicious irony in this fact. Mr. Richards is presumably
getting his Masters Degree in Educational Administration to become a principal or superintendent.
Under the PEA's theory of this case, the teacher has the discretion to determine whether a
professional leave day must be granted. If Mr. Richards were to become an administrator, by this
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arguing

that

a Master's .Degree

in

Education

is

professional

development.

Appellants' Opening Brief, pp. 12 - 14. The .PEA supports this by pointing to

various dictionary definitions .and .other portions of the Master Agreement. In
looking at' the Master Agreement, the PEA points out that the master's degree
would

have

an

affect

on

Mr.

Richards'

salary,

and

therefore constitutes

professional development. Appellants' Opening Brief, p. 13. However, neither the
salary schedule nor the salary requirements refer to the Professional Leave
provision. They also do not specify what sort of credits will affect salary, but only
state when such credits will be counted. R. Vol. I, 106. Thus, once the temporal
hurdle

is

overcome,

any

credits

toward

any

degree

will

count for salary

advancement. Further, the rule cited by the PEA is "words used in one sense in one
part of the contract are deemed to have been used in the same sense in another
part of the same instrument." Bair v. Barron, 97 Idaho 26, 30 (1975). In this case,
the PEA is trying to compare "professional development" in the professional leave
clause with "professional growth" in the salary provisions. Appellants' Opening
Brief, p. 13. There is no indication that these two phrases were intended to be

construed together, as they are not the same wording.
With regard to the dictionary definitions cited by the PEA, the School District
cannot argue that the definitions do not say what they say. But by the same token
it is not clear that the definitions are in any way helpful. The PEA's definition of
lawsuit he would effectively have removed from himself the discretion clearly granted to School
District administration by the terms of the Professional Leave provisions. At a minimum, this goes to
show that it was not unreasonable for the School District to determine that a Masters' Degree in
educational administration does not qualify as professional development.
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"professional" ("an occupation or vocation requiring training in the liberal arts or
the sciences and advanced study in a specialized field," Appel/ants' Opening Brief,
p. 13) is very broad. Under this definition, a teacher is a professional. So are an
astronomer, a doctor, a priest, a lawyer, an orchestra conductor, an architect, and
a cabinet maker. If Mr. Richards chose to develop ("to aid in the growth of,"
Appellants' Opening Brief, p. 13) as an astronomer, doctor, priest, lawyer, etc.,
does that mean under the PEA's interpretation, he must be given time off to
develop his profession? Certainly this is not required or contemplated by the
Professional

Leave provisions.

So

where is the

boundary of

what defines

professional development (as that term is undefined)? The language of the
Professional Leave agreement itself gives some idea of the limits of what
constitutes professional development: "Attendance at educational meetings or
visiting other schools ... to attend a professional meeting, to visit schools ... " R.
Vol.

II, p.

185. This language appears to indicate that the boundaries of

professional development are related to the position the employee already has.
While

the

definitional

boundaries

surrounding

the

term

"professional

development" are vague, what keeps this provision from becoming fatally vague is
that the

ultimate decision

is given to the

Principal

to

determine whether

professional leave will be granted. This person must therefore implicitly also have
the authority to determine what constitutes professional development.
In this case, Mr. Richards received a note informing him that the Principal did
not consider defending a Masters' Degree in educational administration professional

RESPONDENTS' BRIEF - 13

development, as it was not. related to Mr. Richards' duties as a music teacher. R.

Vol. I, p. 73. After filing a grievance, the School Di$trict further notified Mr.
Richards

that

getting

his

master's degree

did

not

qualify

as

professional

development. R. Vol. I, pp. 108 .and 110. These are not unr~aso.nable conclusions.
As Judge Stegner notes, ,;[w]ere there some suggestion that the District were
cultivating Mr. Richards for an administrative position, or if somebody had said to
him we'd like you to pursue administration because we need administrators, I think
the facts would be different." Tr. Vol. I, p. 34, II. 7 - 12. While a master's degree
might affect Mr. Richards' salary, the School District clearly recognized that a
master's degree in education administration was not designed to help Mr. Richards
continue as a music teacher. A music teacher would not get a masters in education
administration to continue working as a music teacher; the goal can only be to
become a principal or superintendent. While a school district administrator .and a
music teacher may be professions within the same general are.a, they are not the
same profession. Therefore, it was reasonable for the School District to determine
that Mr. Richards use of time constituted personal time. It is no different than a
lawyer attempting to become a judge; both professions are in the same field, but
being a judge has very little to do with the lawyer's current case load. Making the
switch (and going through the training for such switch) is a personal effort.
The Professional Leave provision gives the School District discretion in
determining whether to grant professional leave, and inherently to decide what
constitutes professional development. The School District exercised that discretion,
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and certainly Within the bounds of reason. Therefore, there is no cause for this
Court to determine that the School District has breached Mr. Richards' contract, or
the contract with the PEA.
C.

The' Rule of Contra Preferentem is not Appropriate in this .case Because the
Language of the Professional Leave Clause was Negotiated by Both Parties
to the Master Agreement.

The PEA makes a contract interpretation argument,

which under the

circumstances of this case, is not merited. The PEA relies on the rule of contra
proferentem 5 , which holds that "that a contract should be construed most strongly

against the party preparing it or employing the words concerning which doubt
arises." J.R. Simplot Co. v. Bosen, 144 Idaho 611, 616 (2006). There are
numerous Idaho cases which rely on this rule. See Big Butte Ranch v. Grasmick, 91
Idaho 6, 9 (1966); Werry v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 97 Idaho 130, 136 (1975);
Morgan v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 68 Idaho 506, 519 (1948). However, in
each of these cases, the Supreme Court notes in essential factor that is uniformly
present: one party unilaterally provided the language at issue, without the input of
the other party. See J.R. Simplot Co. v. Bosen, 144 Idaho 611, 615 - 1 6 (2006)
("Bosen filled out and signed the Commercial Sales Agreement ... Bosen signed as
the Applicant without designating that he was signing in a representative capacity .
. . The court also stated that any ambiguity created by the manner in which Bosen
filled out and signed the Commercial Sales Agreement should be construed against

"Against the party who proffers or puts forward a thing." Black's Law Dictionary, Rev.
Fourth Ed., "contra proferentem".
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him."); Big Butte Ranch v. Grasmick, 91 Idaho 6, .9 (1966) ("The evidence left no
doubt that appellant, Big Butte Ranch, through its attorney Ranquist, selected the
language in its material parts. Ranquist, acting for aplant [sic], actually drafted the
contract at his office in Salt Lake City and forwarded .it to respondent for
approval."); Werry v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 97 Idaho 130, 136 (1975) ("[T]he
entire contract was written by appellant; the basic agreement was a form provided
by Phillips and the subsequent letters were written by a Phillips employee. Phillips
was the party selecting the language which was used."); Morgan v. Firestone Tire

& Rubber Co., 68 Idaho 506, 519 (1948) ("The contract was on one of
respondent's printed forms, prepared by it and containing its language.").
The rule of contra proferentem is not applicable to every contract. The
Restatement Second of Contracts provides some insight. The Restatement rules
state "In choosing among the reasonable meanings of a promise or agreement or a
term thereof, that meaning is generally preferred which operates against the party
who supplies the words or from whom a writing otherwise proceeds." Restat. 2d
of Contracts,

§

206. This language is in conformity with the Idaho cases cited

above. However, the comments give the rationale for the rule, which indicates that
it isn't always applicable:
a. Rationale. . .. The rule is often invoked in cases of standardized
contracts and in cases where the drafting party has the stronger
bargaining position, but it is not limited to such cases. It is in
strictness a rule of legal effect, sometimes called construction, as well
as interpretation: its operation depends on the positions of the parties
as they appear in litigation, and sometimes the result is hard to
distinguish from a denial of effect to an unconscionable clause.
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Restat. 2d of Contracts, § 206 (comment a). This rationale indicates that the point

of this rule is to, as it were, even the playing field between. parties of different
bargaining strength. As one Court stated,
Since the party of superior bargaining power not only prescribes the
words of the instrument but the party who subscribes to it lacks the
economic strength to change that language, any ambiguity in the
contract is resolved against the draftsman and questions of doubtful
interpretation will be construed in favor of the subscribing party.
Spence v. Omnibus Industries, 44 Cal. App. 3d 970, 974 (Cal. App. 4th Dist.

1975).
Logic would dictate that where the parties are of equal bargaining strength,
then this rule of construction is unnecessary. There are numerous cases which hold
to this proposition. In Joyner v. Adams, 87 N.C. App. 570 (N.C. Ct. App. 1987),
the appellate court remanded the case to the trial court for certain findings of fact.
Joyner v. Adams, 87 N.C. App. 570, 576 (N.C. Ct. App. 1987). On remand the

appellate court gave this advice:
In remanding, we necessarily find that the trial court erred in awarding
judgment for plaintiff based on the rule that ambiguity in contract
terms must be construed most strongly against the party which
drafted the contract. The rule is essentially one of legal effect, of
"construction" rather than "interpretation," since it can scarcely be
said to be designed to ascertain the meanings attached by the parties.
The rule's application rests on a public policy theory that the party
who chose the word is more likely to have provided more carefully for
the protection of his own interests, is more likely to have had reason
to know of uncertainties, and may have even left the meaning
deliberately obscure. Consequently, the rule is usually applied in cases
involving an adhesion contract or where one party is in a stronger
bargaining position, although it is not necessarily limited to those
situations. In this case, where the parties were at arm's length and
were equally sophisticated, we believe the rule was improvidently
invoked.
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Before this rule of construction should be applied, the record should
affirmatively show that "the form of expression in words was actually
chosen by one [party] rather than by the other." The only evidence
admitted regarding who drafted the 1975 amendment is Mr. Joyner's
testimony that no one in his law firm had anything to do with it. Even
assuming this is sufficient to support an inference that defendant or
his agent wrote the provision, it does not establish that defendant can
be charged with havirig chosen its language.
The record reveals that both parties are experienced in the real estate
business and that they bargained from essentially equal positions of
power. The record also shows the parties engaged in a fairly
protracted negotiation process, with the provision in question
undergoing particular scrutiny. Nothing in the record shows that it was
defendant, rather than plaintiff, who "drafted" the provision. Instead,
it appears that the language was assented to by parties who had both
the knowledge to understand its import and the bargaining power to
alter it. Therefore, the policy behind the rule is not served in its
application here and the trial court erred in using the rule to award
judgment for plaintiff.
Joyner v. Adams, 87 N.C. App. 570, 576 - 77 (N.C. Ct. App. 1987) (internal
citations omitted). The appellate court clearly held that the rule put forward by the
PEA is not applicable where both parties contributed to the language of the
contract.
Other courts have held similarly. In an Idaho Federal District Court case, the
judge found as follows:
At the time of the May 9, 2006 ruling on Plaintiff's first Motion for
Summary Judgment, there was evidence and information in the record
explaining that the Contract was "prepared by [Defendants'] attorney
and counsel for [Plaintiff]," that is, it was "negotiated between the
two attorneys," involved "many drafts," and "took a long time." In
addition, Defendants had noted in their summary judgment response
papers that "[a]lthough the Earnest Money Contract was initially
prepared by counsel for the Greensboro Defendants, the parties
exchanged at least nine (9) separate drafts of the [Contract] prior to
its execution." Thus, the Court did not apply the principle that
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ambiguities should be construed against the party who drafted the
instrument because the record demonstrated that both parties and
their counsel actively participated in negotiations leading to drafting of
the final version of the Contract.
Even if Greensboro had chosen the language in Section 9.4(e) without
any'input or negotiation with Plaintiff's counsel, the rule Plaintiff relies
on (known as the rule of contra proferentum · [sic]) is usually applied in
cases involving an adhesion contract or where one party is in a
stronger bargaining position, although it is not necessarily limited to
those situations.
DBS/ Signature Place, LLC v. Bl Greensboro, l.P., 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 86367,
*9 - *10 (D. Idaho Nov. 28, 2006) (internal citations omitted). 6
Other cases have held similarly. "[W]hen the parties to the insurance
agreement are sophisticated and jointly negotiate the policy, there is no need to
construe ambiguities against the insurance company. The intent of construction
against the insurer arises from concern over the lack of bargaining power between
the insurance company and the insured." Fountain Powerboat Indus. v. Reliance
Ins. Co., 119 F. Supp. 2d 552, 555 (E.D.N.C. 2000). Another case has stated
"[w]hile it may be true as a general rule that ambiguities are construed against the
drafter, there are a number of reasons why that principle should not apply,"
including when the contracting parties are sophisticated, commercial entities who
negotiated on equal footing and the language at issue was accepted without
negotiation or comment. In re HWC liquidating Co., 1999 WL 33631231, * 5

6

The Court in DBS/ Signature Place, LLC, later determined that summary judgment was not
appropriate in this case, as there was an issue of fact as to whether both parties contributed to a
particular provision, or whether one party created it unilaterally, DBS/ Signature Place, LLC, 2006
U.S. Dist, Lexis 86367 at *14. In this case, the facts show that the Professional Leave clause was
clearly negotiated by both parties.
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(W.D.N.C. 1999) (cited in. DBS/ Signature Place, LLC, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
86367 at *14).
While there does not appear to be an Idaho state court case holding that the
rule of contra proferentem .does not apply in every contract case, there is similarly
no Idaho case holding that it must be applied. Each of the Idaho cases cited above
shows that one party unilaterally provided the language at issue. In this case, the
facts show that this was not what occurred. As noted above, both the School
District and the PEA provided proposed language for the Professional Leave clause.
See R. Vol. I, p. 87. The enacted language of the Profes.sional Leave clause is
neither solely the language proposed by the PEA or solely the language proposed
by the School District, but is an amalgam of the two, and in fact, contains
language that was not originally proposed by either party. As Judge Stegner said,
"I don't think I've ever seen an as arms-length agreement as that which I tried to
help hammer out." Tr. Vol. I, p. 13, II. 13 - 15. Under these circumstances, it is
not necessary to apply the rule of contra preferentem.
It should be noted that the rule applies "Where there is doubtful language in
a contract." J.R. Simplot Co. v. Bosen, 144 Idaho 611, 616 (2006). The PEA
contends

that

the

doubtful

language

is

the

term

"pursue

professional

development". Appellants' Opening Brief, pp. 12 - 13. The PEA spends significant
amounts of time discussing how when Mr. Richards was defending his Master's
Degree final project, he was pursuing "professional development". Appellants'

Opening Brief, pp. 12 - 15. However, one particular comment in the PEA's brief
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compels the School District to conclude that the true language at issue · is not
"professional development". The PEA states

"For al.I of these reasons, the

Professional Leave provisions of the Master Agreement unambiguously required the
School District to approve Richards' request to use a professional leave day ..

"

Appellants' Opening Brief, pp. 13 - 14 (emphasis added). The issue then is not

whether

Mr.

Richards'

master's · degree

project

constitutes

professional

development, but whether there is any discretion. The PEA would have this Court
conclude (as it attempted to do with the District Court), that when professional
leave is requested, it must be granted. As noted by the PEA very early in these
proceedings,
While leave approvals must come from the principal concerning
teacher absences, nowhere in the language of the Master Agreement
concerning professional leave does it suggest that the administration
(principal, superintendent or board) has the sole right to determine
what professional development is. The professional himself/herself
clearly should be left to make that determination within reason of the
teaching profession [sic] and the limitation of two days [sic] if they
have
not
already
been
afforded
professional
development
opportunities.
R.

Vol.

I,

p.

111.

Thus,

the

troublesome

language

is

not

"professional

development", but is "if such absence is approved by the Principal." R. Vol. I, p.
185 (Master Agreement § 10.5). Oddly, though both the School District and the
PEA both suggested a version of this language, the actual language contained in
the Professional Leave provision is the language proposed by the PEA. Compare R.
Vol. I, p. 87 with R. Vol. II, pp. 185 - 86. Thus, if the PEA is so adamant that the

rule of contra preferentem be applied, then in reality it should be applied against the
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PEA. The facts show that if the PEA did not want any discretion on the part of the
School District, they should not have suggested the language that gave the
principal the discretion to determine whether professional leave will be allowed.
They should have required that the Professional Leave provision contain the same
mandatory language as ever'y other leave provision in the Master Agreement. Or in
the alternative, the PEA should have demanded the inclusion of language that
spelled out the limits of the principal' s discretion, or give the discretion to the
certificated personnel requesting professional leave. Because they did not, the
Court will either dictate that the School District has unlimited discretion, or in the
alternative (as described above), a reasonableness standard is implied into the
Professional Leave clause. In either case, the School District should prevail.
This case is not about what the PEA would like the Court to believe it is
about. It is not about whether the School District improperly denied Mr. Richards'
request to take a professional leave day. Quite the opposite, the PEA is realizing
that the Professional Leave provision to which they agreed is not mandatory, which
they clearly want it to be. Now they are trying to convince this Court that the
Professional Leave clause is mandatory, and that the School District must
automatically grant professional leave when requested. Further, the PEA would
have this Court conclude that the employee and not the School District has the
discretion to determine what is and what is not professional leave. However, the
language on that point is extraordinarily clear, and is certainly not ambiguous.
"Attendance at educational meetings or visiting other schools is permitted at full
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pay if such absence is approved by the Principal." R, Vol. I, p. 185 (emphasis
added). The language could not be any clearer.
The PEA

argues that

Judge Stegner rewrote the Professional Leave

provisions of the Master Agreement to the benefit · of the School District.
Appellants' Opening Brief, p. 15. This, however, is exactly what the PEA was (and

is) trying to do; they want the Professional Leave provision to be read as giving the
employee

the · discretion,

making

professional

leave

mandatory.

This

is

inappropriate. Just as Judge Stegner read the language of the Professional Leave
provision interpreted its straightforward language7, the School District requests that
this Court similarly apply the straightforward language of the Professional Leave
provision. If the rule of contra proferentem applies, it should be applied against the
PEA, who provided the discretionary language. The School District reasonably
acted within its discretion. As Judge Stegner noted, though one may not agree
with the School District's determination, Tr. Vol. I, p. 35, II. 8 - 10, it is clearly not
an unreasonable conclusion.
D.

If the "Professional Development" Language in the Professional Leave Clause
is Ambiguous, the Interpretation of the District Court and the School District
Should Not be Disturbed on Appeal.

If this Court agrees with the PEA that the language at issue in the
Professional Leave clause is the "professional development" language, then it
would appear, at a minimum, that the language is ambiguous, because it is

7

Admittedly, Judge Stegner implied a reasonableness standard into the discretion of the
School District. However, as discussed above, there are a number of cases holding that this may be
allowable.
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reasonably susceptible to conflicting interpretations. See Melichar v. State Farm
Fire and Cas. Co., 143 Idaho 716, 720 {2007) .. Both the School District and the

PEA contend that this language is unambiguous. Appellants' Opening Brief, p. 14.
However, clearly, both the School District and the. PEA have come to
different

conclusions

regarding

whether

Mr.

Richards'

master's

degree

in

educational administration falls within the ambit of "professional development".
There is significant caselaw holding that the interpretation of an ambiguous
contract should not be disturbed on appeal if there is substantial and competent
evidence to support the interpretation. Similarly, this Court has held numerous
times that the discretionary decisions of a school board should not be second
guessed by the courts. Each of these issues is discussed below.

1.

Judge Stegner' s interpretation of the Professional Leave clause is
supported by substantial and competent evidence, and should not be
overturned on appeal.

"If a contract is found ambiguous, its interpretation is a question of fact."
Shawver v.

Huckleberry Estates, L.L. C.,

140 Idaho 354, 361

(2004).

"The

question of whether a contract is ambiguous is itself a question of law." Boe/ v.
Stewart Title Guar. Co., 137 Idaho 9, 13 (2002). As questions of law are reviewed

de novo on appeal, see Mut. of Enumclaw v. Box, 127 Idaho 851, 852 (1995), this
Court must determine whether the contract itself was ambiguous. If the contract is
ambiguous, then Judge Stegner's findings regarding whether the term "professional
development" includes Mr. Richards' master's degree in educational administration
is a question of fact. Factual findings will not be disturbed on appeal if they are
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supported by substantial and competent, though conflicting, evidence. See Circle C
Ranch Co. v. Jayo, 104 Idaho 353, 355 (1983); Stout v. Westover, 106 Idaho

533, 534 (1984); Deer Creek, Inc. v. Clarendon Hot Springs Ranch, Inc., 107
Idaho 286, 290 (Idaho · Ct. App. 1984) (the appellate ·court is "constrained to
uphold the district judge's findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous.").
Further, the summary judgment standard changes where there will be a nonjury
trial:
When an action will be tried before the court without a jury, the judge
is not constrained to draw inferences in favor of the party opposing a
motion for summary judgment but rather the trial judge is free to arrive
at the most probable inferences to be drawn from uncontroverted
evidentiary facts.
Loomis v. Hailey, 11 9 Idaho 434, 437 ( 1 991). See also Riverside Dev. Co. v.
Ritchie, 103 Idaho 515,519 (1982); Blackmon v. Zufelt, 108 Idaho 469, 470

(Idaho Ct. App. 1985). As the PEA notes, the demand for a jury trial was
withdrawn, and this issue was to be a bench trial. Appellants' Opening Brief, p. 2.
Therefore, Judge Stegner was allowed to draw what he believed were to be the
most reasonable inferences from the facts presented.
As discussed above, the School District believes that there is substantial and
competent evidence to support the interpretation that Mr. Richards' master's
degree

in

educational

administration

does

not

qualify

as

"professional

development". Specifically, there are the inherent limits in the language of the
Professional

Leave

clause

itself

that

give

guidance

to

this

interpretation.

Professional leave is specifically intended to be used for certificated personnel to
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attend "educational meetings" or to "visit[] other schools". R. Vol. II, p. 185. The
Professional

Leave

clause

professional

meeting,

to

also

allows

visit

schools,

for

professional
or

otherwise

leave
pursue

"to

attend

a

professional

development." R. Vol. II,. p. 186. These limitations are d_irectly related to the
performance of a teacher's current duties, as opposed to their future career.
"Educational meetings," "visiting other schools," and "professional meetings" do
not in any way relate to a music teacher's desire to become an administrator. A
contract must be read as a whole. Daugharty v. Post Falls Highway Dist., 134
Idaho 731, 735 (2000). Therefore, it makes little sense for.the PEA to argue that
three of the restrictions listed in the Professional Leave clause relate specifically to
the teacher's current duties, and that the fourth limit ("professional development")
is open ended, and can include anything related to possible future careers, whether
in or out of the same field. The "professional development" limitation should be
read

with the same intention as the other limitations: namely, professional

development means development related to the teacher's current duties.
Judge Stegner clearly understood this. He indicated that were Mr. Richards'
master's degree in "pedagogy, music pedagogy, music performance, anything that I
would consider to be within the ambit of Mr. Richards' responsibilities, I don't think
there would be any doubt that that would - that this decision would be different
that it is today." Tr. Vol. I, p. 34, II. 3 - 7. As Judge Stegner had a significant
amount of involvement in the drafting of the Master Agreement, he certainly was in
the best position to make this determination. Further, because this matter was
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going to be a bench trial, Judge Stegner was allowed to look at the issues arid was
free to arrive at the most probable inferences from the evidence. Given this
freedom, Judge Stegner made a determination regarding how the "professional
development" language should be interpreted.
If this Court concludes that there was an ambiguity in the Professional Leave
clause, it should not reverse Judge Stegner's decision. There is competent and
substantial evidence to support the conclusion that Mr. Richards' master's degree
does not constitute professional development, and therefore professional leave was
not available.

2.

Because the School District's decision was discretionary, it should not
be disturbed on appeal.

As discussed above, the Professional Leave clause gives the School District
the discretion to determine whether to grant professional leave to certificated
employees. The record shows that the School District's interpretation, throughout
the grievance process to the present, has been that Mr. Richards' master's degree
in educational administration does not qualify as professional development. See R.
Vol. I, pp. 73, 108, 110, and 112 - 13. This decision was an exercise of discretion
by the School District.
The Idaho Supreme Court has stated numerous times that discretionary
decisions by a school board should not be overturned by the courts absent arbitrary
or capricious conduct. See Robinson v. Joint Sch. Dist., 100 Idaho 263, 265
(1979) (citing language that the discretionary conduct of a school board should not
be reviewed absent allegations of arbitrary or capricious conduct); Kolp v. Board of
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Trustees, 102 Idaho 320, 322 -'- 23 (1981) (holding that in mandamus actions
relating to teacher terminations, "If discretionary, mandamus will not lie unless it
clearly appears that the board has acted arbitrarily, unjustly and in abuse of
discretion 'and there is not available 0th.er plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law"); Bowler v. Board of Trustees, 101 Idaho 537, 540 (1980)
(stating that the Court was not aware of any statute "providing for judicial
appellate review from decisions of the board of trustees of a school district");
Rogers v. Gooding Pub. Joint Sch. Dist. No. 231 {in Re Rogers), 135 Idaho 480,

483 (2001) (discipline of students is a discretionary issue, into which courts should
only reluctantly involve themselves}. This is a logical conclusion. School boards are
in a unique situation: they must defend their students from injury from without and
within, 8 they must defend and support their teachers 9 , and at the same time, they
are frequently sued by both. In dealing with these conflicting interests (and many,
many others), school boards have relatively little statutory guidance regarding how
to proceed, and frequently are without adequate funding to meet their obligations.
Thus, school districts are left to their own devices to determine how to move
forward without being sued.
This puts school boards and school districts in a situation where they are
uniquely qualified to determine how they will proceed, because the best answer is
not always immediately clear. However, in discretionary situations, school districts

8

See, e.g., Idaho Code

§

33-512(4).

9

See, e.g., Idaho Code

§

6-903(bl,
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are not required to come up with the best answer, but are only required to come up
with a reasonable answer. That is what occurred in this. case .. The School District
determined that the Professional Leave clause gives the School District discretion
to determlne when to grant professional leave. The Scho.ol District employees
determined that Mr. Richards' should take personal leave to defend his master's
degree, and the Board agreed. This may or may not be the absolute best decision,
but it is certainly a reasonable one. Therefore, in such a discretionary situation, it
would be improper for this Court to overturn the School District's decision absent
evidence of arbitrary or capricious conduct. As the United States Supreme Court
has stated,
Judicial interposition in the operation of the public school system of
the Nation raises problems requiring care and restraint . . . . By and
large, public education in our Nation is committed to the control of
state and local authorities. Courts do not and cannot intervene in the
resolution of conflicts which arise in the daily operation of school
systems and which do not directly and sharply implicate basic
constitutional values.
Epperson v. Ark., 393 U.S. 97, 104 (1968). As the PEA hasn't put forward

evidence of arbitrary or capricious conduct, the School District requests that this
Court affirm the District Court's decision.
E.

The School District is Entitled to Attorney Fees on Appeal Because the PEA's
Argument is Unreasonable.

There are two statutes under which attorney fees may be awarded. /.C. §
12-121 states "In any civil action, the judge may award reasonable attorney's fees
to the prevailing party or parties." I. C. § 1 2-11 7 states
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Unless otherwise provided by statute, in any administrative or civil
judicial proceeding involving as adverse parties a state agency, a city,
a county or other taxing district and a person, th.e court shall award
the prevailing party reasonable attorney's fees, witness fees and
reasonable expenses, if the court finds that the party against whom
the judgment is rendered acted without a reasonable basis in fact or
law:
This Court has applied both of these statutes to cases involving governmental
entities. See Sacred Heart Med. Ctr. v. Boundary County, 138 Idaho 534, 537
(2003).
With regard to /. C. § 1 2-1 21, an award under this statute is appropriate "if
the appellate court finds that the appeal was brought or pursued unreasonably or
without foundation." Wolske Bros. v. Hudspeth Sawmill Co., 11 6 Idaho 714, 71 6
(Idaho Ct. App. 1989). Such an award can be made if "the appellant has made no
substantial showing that the lower court misapplied the law." Id. Where a party
makes an argument that at first reads reasonably, but then on later inspection is
discovered to be based on unreasonable grounds, an award of attorney fees against
that party is appropriate. See O'Boskey v. First Fed. Sav. & loan Ass'n, 112 Idaho
1 002, 101 0 ( 1987). With regard to /. C.

§

12-11 7, the statute clearly spells out

that attorney fees may be awarded if "the party against whom the judgment is
rendered acted without a reasonable basis in fact or law." See also Daw v. Sch.
Dist. 91 Bd. of Trs., 136 Idaho 806, 808 (2001) (holding that an unreasonable
statutory interpretation was grounds for awarding attorney fees).
In this case, the PEA's argument (based on the rule of contra proferentem)
seems logical, but on further inspection, it is clear that the rule is inapplicable. In
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bringing this appeal, the PEA makes the same argument that it made in front of
Judge Stegner, namely that the language at issue was unilaterally provided by the
School District. Compare Appellants Opening Brief, pp. 11 - 15, with R. Vol. /, pp.
59 - 62. This is clearly not the .case.· Both parties negotiate.ct the language of the
Professional Leave provision. There is no evidence that Judge Stegner misapplied
the law. Therefore, the PEA's argument is unreasonable, and the School District
requests that attorney fees be granted on appeal.

V.

CONCLUSION

The PEA and the School District negotiated for a long period of time to work
out the language of the Master Agreement. It is not unreasonable to assume that
neither party was completely satisfied with the language. However, both parties
agreed to it, including the language of the Professional Leave clause. Unlike every
other type of leave in the Master Agreement, the Professional Leave clause clearly
gives the School District discretion whether to grant professional leave. With regard
to Mr. Richards' request to take profession leave to defend his master's degree in
educational administration, the School District determined that this was outside the
scope of his employment duties, and therefore was more appropriately categorized
as a personal day. The PEA now seeks to rewrite the Professional Leave clause to
take away the discretion from the School District, and make professional leave just
as mandatory as every other type of leave. The District Court recognized that the
School District had discretion, and further recognized that the School District's
decision was reasonable. There is no evidence to contradict this conclusion.
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Therefore, summary judgment was appropriately granted to the School District. The
School District requests that this Court will so find.

.
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